Thinking outside the gundeck: maritime history, the royal navy and the outbreak of British civil war, 1625–42 by Blakemore, Richard J.
Thinking outside the gundeck: maritime history, the royal navy and the outbreak of 
British civil war, 1625-1642. 
Richard J. Blakemore 
University of Exeter 
 
Maritime history seems to be suffering an identity crisis. Its recent resurgence in popularity 
has been widely observed, usually associated with the concurrent rise in scholarship on the 
Atlantic and Indian Ocean ‘worlds’, and world and global history, all of which naturally 
involve substantial maritime elements.1 Yet, beyond commending the oceanic perspective, 
and often praising its potential for overcoming national or imperial narratives, reﬂections on 
what this particular sub-discipline is, could or should be offer no consensus on how the 
historical activities of seafarers can be understood, or their collective role in history. No 
dominant methodology has emerged for studying the maritime past – and some even question 
whether one should – though numerous intriguing ideas have been suggested, frequently by 
social geographers.2 
 Moreover, some advocates for this ﬁeld are still dissatisﬁed with what is written under 
the aegis of maritime history, or fear that its seemingly great potential has not been realized, 
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or might be overstated.3 . Another concern is that, for all the developments of the last two 
decades, it has yet to have its rightful place acknowledged by other scholars, perhaps because 
the term ‘maritime history’ has not entirely escaped the connotations of antiquarian interest in 
nautical detail and naval hagiography, particularly in Britain where the royal navy continues 
to dominate the popular imagination of the seafaring past.4 Whether these anxieties are 
justiﬁed or not, at least in anglophone scholarship, naval studies preponderate, and in both 
naval and maritime history there is much greater concentration on the eighteenth century and 
after, for which records are vastly more plentiful. 
Despite the recent vitality of maritime history, innumerable speciﬁc studies of 
seafarers and wide recognition of their local and global signiﬁcance in economic terms, 
seafarers and their place in the past remain marginal to mainstream historical scholarship. If 
the lack of coherence among maritime scholars is one reason for this marginalization (and 
this very diversity could well be maritime history’s greatest strength), another explanation 
might be the popularity of the stereotype, evident in European culture from the medieval 
period onwards, of the ‘seaman’ as totally separate, isolated and unfathomable to 
contemporaries, a cultural trope that seafarers themselves deployed, and which still endures.5 
This stereotype is evident in some, though by no means all, writings on the royal 
navy, including a quite recent addition to the ‘Jack Tar’ tradition, which takes an eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century image and applies it to seafarers throughout history.6 It is perhaps also 
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encouraged by those scholars such as Jesse Lemisch, and those inﬂuenced by him, who in 
adopting a Marxist perspective deﬁne seafarers in primarily economic terms, placing them in 
a confrontational model with the capitalist society ashore which drove demand for their 
labour.7 It may be signiﬁcant that these scholars, while rejecting some aspects of the 
stereotype, still use the term ‘Jack Tar’ not to describe a cultural phenomenon but to refer to 
real seafarers. Even if the term is mostly absent from economic maritime history, here too 
individual seafarers are indistinct in a statistical mass.8  In this emphasis on the isolation and 
homogeneity of seafarers, the three very different ways of seeing the past which primarily 
inform maritime history, and possibly account for the identity crisis – the nation-state focused 
study of navies, the quantitative approach of economics, and the trans- or even anti-national 
impulses of oceanic, world and global history – perhaps share more than they realize. 
It is the argument of this article that these perspectives, by relying on the stereotype or 
by reducing seafarers’ interests to primarily economic motivations, have not given sufﬁcient 
consideration to critically important relationships between seafarers and shore society. What 
some have chosen to call the ‘new maritime history’, with its emphasis on the social history 
of seafarers, has been more attentive to interactions between seafarers and societies, but this 
has not yet gone far enough.9 These connections must be central to our investigations if we 
are truly to understand seafarers in history. 
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9 For an overview of the ‘new maritime history’, see V. J. Patarino,‘The religious shipboard culture of 16th- and 
17th-century English sailors’, in The Social History of English Seamen, 1485 – 1649, ed. C.A. Fury 
(Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 141 – 92 , at pp. 142 – 51; key pieces include V. Burton, ‘The myth of bachelor Jack: 
masculinity, patriarchy and seafaring labour’, in Jack Tar in History: Essays in the History of Maritime Life and 
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This argument will be explored here by an analysis of British seafarers’ activities 
during the early years of Britain’s mid seventeenth-century revolutionary decades, when their 
involvement in popular politics renders their connections with society particularly clear. 
Lemisch, one of the earliest leaders of the ‘new maritime’ movement, discussed the 
involvement of seamen in the American revolution, portraying them as ‘outcasts, men with 
little hope of success ashore . . . these were the rebels’ who, in reaction ﬁrst to impressment 
then to the Stamp Act, became revolutionaries.10 Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh have 
likewise described sailors as part of the ‘Atlantic proletariat’ which, they argue, was critical 
to the ‘age of revolutions’ in the later eighteenth century; but they also push this 
interpretation back to the English revolution of the sixteen-forties.11 . Yet very little detailed 
work has been done on the role of seafarers in the popular politics of that decade. Indeed, 
naval scholars have sometimes dismissed the early seventeenth century altogether, and 
usually explain the fact that the royal navy sided against the king mostly in terms of internal 
naval affairs, or as a result of naval politics in which some ofﬁcers were more successful than 
others in ‘seizing the ﬂeet’.12 
Focusing on the outbreak of civil war in 1640-2 (depending on who you believe, 
either the English revolution, or the ﬁrst of a series), this article explores the evidence for 
seafarers’ involvement in the escalation into violent conﬂict.13 More importantly, it asks what 
this reveals about their relationship to society more generally during the early modern period, 
especially the extent to which that relationship was shaped by their vocational maritime 
identity and their economic interests. To do so, it takes a broader approach and considers the 
experience of the maritime community, principally those based in London, throughout the 
reign of Charles I. Given the emphasis placed by historians on the choice of the royal ﬂeet to 
side with parliament in July 1642 as a barometer of attitudes in the maritime community 
more generally, the article will examine the interpretations presented by historians of the 
reasons behind this decision, and why these are unsatisfactory. Then, it will survey the 
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available evidence for seafarers’ participation in both popular and local political agitation, 
comparing riots during the sixteen-twenties with those of the sixteen-forties. This evidence 
compellingly shows that seafarers were actively engaged in the political debates of the early 
sixteen-forties not only for economic reasons, or as a form of class conﬂict, but because of 
more complex social interactions, particularly through a shared religious identity. Finally, the 
conclusion will reﬂect on the implications of this particular study for the practice of naval and 
maritime history. 
 
When most of the royal ﬂeet sided with parliament in the summer of 1642, it was in 
immediate terms the outcome of a political wrangle over the appointment of ofﬁcers. On 1 
July 1642, the earl of Northumberland presented to parliament a letter from the king in which 
he was discharged from his post as lord admiral.14 That same day ‘for the Safety of His 
Majesty’s Person, the Parliament and Kingdom, in this Time of imminent Danger’, 
parliament nominated the earl of Warwick, an inﬂuential ﬁgure in opposition and well 
connected to merchants and seafarers through his investment in privateer and colonial 
voyages, to ‘command in chief the Ships of the Fleet now at Sea’.15 In fact Warwick was 
already effectively in command, parliament having required Northumberland to appoint him 
as his deputy in March.16 Charles had opposed this decision in favour of Sir John Pennington, 
a naval ofﬁcer of long standing, who had been vice-admiral during the sixteen-thirties; 
parliament, however, ignored these objections.17 When Charles later dismissed 
Northumberland, this was, according to the royalist memoirist the earl of Clarendon, mainly 
intended to remove Warwick.18 The king wrote to Warwick on 28 June to declare void his 
appointment by Northumberland, and also to ofﬁcers at the Chatham dockyards, and to the 
captains of the ﬂeet, ordering them to obey Pennington rather than Warwick.19 
                                                             
14 Lords Journal, v. 169. 
15 L.J., v. 174; Commons Journal, ii. 647, 650. S. Kelsey, ‘Rich, Robert, 2 nd earl of Warwick (1587 – 1658)’, 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23494> 
[accessed 12 Feb. 2013]; a detailed account of Warwick’s role in 1640 – 2 is given in J. Adamson, The Noble 
Revolt: the Overthrow of Charles I (2007). For the journal of one of these privateer voyages, which Warwick 
himself commanded, see W. Ball, ‘Might and would not’, pr. in ‘The earl of Warwick’s voyage in 1627 ’, ed. N. 
P. Bard, in The Naval Miscellany, v, ed. N. A. M. Rodger (1984), 15 – 93. 
16 L.J., iv. 645; L.J., v. 20 – 1, 70 – 2, 80, 85, 91; C.J., ii. 474, 478. 
17 L.J., iv. 665, 695, 676, 697; C.J., ii. 495, 499 – 500, 509 – 10; A Message from Both Hovses of 
Parliament…that the Earle of Warwick might Command this Summers Fleet (2 Apr. 1642). On Pennington, see 
A. Thrush, ‘Pennington, Sir John (bap. 1584?, d. 1646)’, O.D.N.B. 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/21842> [accessed 12 Feb. 2013]. 
18 Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England Begun in the Year 
1641, ed. W. Dunn Macray (6 vols., Oxford, 1888 ; repr. 1992), ii. 209 – 16. 
19 L.J., v. 178 – 80, 223. 
 Pennington, after some hesitation, carried the letters to the ﬂeet, arriving on 2 July; 
but, rather than go to the ﬂeet himself, he sent Sir Henry Palmer, another former naval ofﬁcer, 
to express the king’s commands to the captains.20 Alerted to this danger, Warwick called a 
council of war at which seventeen captains and masters pledged their support for him and for 
parliament’s ordinance appointing him. Five captains – all of whom had served in the navy 
during the sixteen-thirties – wrote to Warwick explaining that they could not disobey the 
king.21 One of these subsequently submitted to Warwick, who surrounded the four other 
ships, ordering them to surrender; two did. According to Warwick’s account, the response of 
the last two captains was ‘so peremptory’ and ‘my Masters and sailors grew so impatient on 
them’ that, despite being unarmed, they boarded and seized both captains and their ships.22 
 These ﬁve captains were promptly declared ‘delinquents’, and three of them were 
brought to parliament.23 On 7 July, parliament ordered all ‘Ships that are in the Service of the 
State’ to obey Warwick.24 Despite Charles’s attempt on the same day to scotch parliament’s 
plans by forbidding the principal administrative ofﬁcers of the navy to obey his opponents, 
parliament’s naval preparations continued apace, and they successfully captured a few other 
naval vessels.25 This contest for the control of military forces, though it was less widely 
debated than the concurrent militia controversy, also accelerated the coming of civil war in 
England and to some extent shaped the conﬂict that ensued.26 The contradictory demands 
made by king and parliament both used a language of general appeal but articulated a clear 
division, forcing seafarers to make difﬁcult decisions and become combatants even before 
war was declared. 
                                                             
20 On Palmer, see R. McCaughey, ‘Palmer, Sir Henry (bap. 1582 , d. 1644)’, O.D.N.B. 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/65990> [accessed 12 Feb. 2013]. 
21 For the pre-war careers of these ofﬁcers, see D. Kennedy, ‘Naval captains at the outbreak of the English civil 
war’, Mariner’s Mirror, xlvi (1960), 181 – 98. 
22 These events are described in Warwick’s letters in L.J., v. 178 – 80, 185, which were published in A letter 
sent from the right honorable Robert earle of Warwik (6 July 1642), printed in two separate editions (Another 
declaration of the Lords and Commons…and a letter from the earle of Warwick (7 July 1642), sig. A 1 v; and 
The earl of VVarwicks letter from aboard his majesties ship, called the James (7 July 1642)); another, shorter, 
parliamentarian account was published in The kings majesties resolvtion concerning, Robert earl of Warwicke 
(12 July 1642). 
23 Sir John Mennes, the rear-admiral, protested that ‘as soon as he heard that…Warwick had an Ordinance of 
Parliament’, he willingly submitted (L.J., v. 189 – 90; cf. pp. 195, 218 – 19). 
24 L.J., v. 188; C.J., ii. 654, 657. 
25 For Charles’s orders, see L.J., v. 224; for naval preparations, see L.J., v. 194, 198 – 9, 206, 213, 216; C.J., ii. 
670, 678, 723; Anon., The parliaments desires to the earl of Warwicke (21 July 1642). 
26 For the militia in London, see K. Lindley, Popular Politics and Religion in Civil War London (Aldershot, 
1997), pp. 199 – 211; L. Nagel, ‘“A great bouncing at every man’s door”: the struggle for London’s militia in 
1642’, in London and the Civil War, ed. S. Porter (Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 65 – 88; for the wider debates, see I. 
Gentles, The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms, 1638 – 1652 (Harlow, 2007), pp. 91 – 
105; M. Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire: a New History of the English Civil Wars (2008), pp. 186 – 238 . 
 Most historians’ accounts of these events, including in general discussions of the civil 
wars or of the navy, have followed Clarendon’s focus on Pennington and Warwick as the key 
actors in the drama, usually contrasting Pennington’s indecision with Warwick’s dynamic 
resolve, though Pennington and Palmer are often excused on the grounds of their old age.27 
Descriptions of the ﬂeet as ‘seized’ or ‘lost’ neatly encapsulate this assumption that the 
important political actions were taken by the commanding ofﬁcers, and perhaps the captains; 
that the ﬂeet was merely waiting around to be seized. Even though Stephen Greenberg, for 
example, argued that ‘what was “lost” by the king, or “seized” by parliament, was not ships 
but the allegiance of those on board’, this still reduces the sailors’ political agency essentially 
to a responsive role.28 
 Where any analysis of the motivation of sailors in these political decisions is offered, 
it usually revolves around the treatment of naval sailors, assuming that seafarers’ decisions 
were determined only by issues internal to their profession. This was ﬁrst argued by Michael 
Oppenheim in his inﬂuential nineteenth-century study of the Tudor and Stuart navy, and 
adopted practically wholesale by John Powell in his book on the civil war navy, as well as 
more recently by Greenberg and others.29 The assumption is that sailors were either incapable 
of understanding, or were uninterested in, the debates taking place throughout Britain about 
the relationship between king and parliament, church and state. According to Powell they 
were ‘simple, blunt, childlike men, upon whose minds the hardships of poverty, hunger and 
cold weighed heavily, to the exclusion of everything else. They were matter-of-fact 
individuals with the greater part of their attention ﬁxed on pay and food’.30 The origins of this 
theory very likely lie in the condescending, and largely puzzled, descriptions offered by 
                                                             
27 Clarendon, ii. 216 – 26; M. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant 
Shipping in Relation to the Navy from MDIX to MDCLX (1896), pp. 240 – 1; J. R. Powell, The Navy in the 
English Civil War (Hamden, Conn., 1962), pp. 19 – 22; A. D. Thrush, ‘The navy under Charles I, 1625 – 40 ’ 
(unpublished University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1990), pp. 39 – 44; K. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: 
Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 184 – 6 , though see also pp. 
80 – 1; S. J. Greenberg, ‘Seizing the ﬂeet in 1642 : parliament, the navy, and the printing press’, Mariner’s 
Mirror, lxxvii (1991), 227 – 34 , at pp. 229 – 31 . For general accounts, see R. Harding, The Evolution of the 
Sailing Navy, 1509 – 1815 (Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 58 – 62 ; N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: a 
Naval History of Britain, 660 – 1649 (1997), pp. 414 – 15; Gentles, pp. 95 – 6; Braddick, pp. 214 – 15. 
28 Greenberg, pp. 227, 233. 
29 Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 222, 230, 241 – 3; Powell, pp. 10 – 11, is based almost entirely 
on Oppenheim; it is also the interpretation favoured by Donald Kennedy in his thesis, ‘Parliament and the navy, 
1642 – 8: a political history of the navy during the civil war’ (unpublished University of Cambridge Ph.D. 
thesis, 1959), pp. 17 – 28; Greenberg. For its appearance elsewhere, see G. E. Mainwaring, ‘The dress of the 
British seaman’, Mariner’s Mirror, ix (1923), 322 – 32, at p. 322; Lloyd, p. 52; Lafﬁn, p. 8; Kemp, p. 23; 
Lavery, p. 61; J. Scott, When the Waves Ruled Britannia: Geography and Political Identities, 1500 – 1800 
(Cambridge, 2011), pp. 70 – 2. 
30 Powell, p. 11. Here, Powell is paraphrasing Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 240 – 1. 
Clarendon, who as a royalist peer was not exactly disposed to empathize with parliamentarian 
seafarers.31 
 Charles’s neglect of the seamen – following a period of administrative corruption and 
naval inaction under his father – therefore drove them into the arms of parliament.32 
Greenberg asserts that ‘Charles spent money on the ships themselves, not on the men who 
sailed them’.33 This interpretation is essentially based upon the catalogue of mistreatment 
collected by Oppenheim, who certainly provided ample evidence of administrative 
inefﬁciency and corruption which resulted in unhealthy food, insufﬁcient supplies and 
irregular pay.34 This situation, it is argued, so disenchanted the sailors of the navy that the 
prospect of regular pay and supplies offered by parliament in 1642 was irresistible. Yet, as 
Oppenheim himself tacitly acknowledged that conditions may have improved during the 
sixteen-thirties, his account, and those of his followers, encounter substantial problems as an 
explanation for the events of the sixteen-forties.35 
 Moreover, the ﬂeet was always a minority of the population of the British maritime 
community. Andrew Thrush suggested a naval population of between 5,000 and 10,000 in the 
war years of 1625 – 30, dropping with the conclusion of peace and then rising again to 
somewhere around 4,500 in the later sixteen-thirties.36 Thrush, Christopher Lloyd and 
Kenneth Andrews estimated the total number of seafarers in England (not Britain) at 20 – 
25,000 in 1629, a low point due to the preceding war years, and both Andrews and Thrush 
posited that considerable expansion occurred in the next decade.37 Therefore, the navy never 
employed at one time more than half, and usually less than a quarter, of English, let alone 
British, seafarers. 
 The frequent ﬂuctuation in naval personnel may have drawn in larger numbers of 
seafarers than these estimates suggest, but if it did, it also reduced the amount of time they 
were likely to spend in the navy. Some ofﬁcers, including warrant ofﬁcers, did remain in 
naval service for a long time, or at least claimed to have done so when petitioning the 
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admiralty.38 However, the continuation throughout this period of impressment, the complaints 
that men absented themselves from service, and the proclamations forbidding them to do so, 
show that new sailors were constantly needed.39 Pennington’s journal for the sixteen-thirties 
records regular pressing of sailors, often to replace men he was simultaneously discharging.40 
If we are to believe the complaints of some naval ofﬁcers, pressing often brought in men 
from a wide range of backgrounds, not just sailors.41 
 The amount of seafarers who, in 1642, would have memories of naval service during 
the difﬁcult years of the later sixteen-twenties and early sixteen-thirties is therefore 
questionable.42 This is supported by the youth of many seafarers; a large proportion of those 
at sea in the sixteen-forties would have been infants two decades earlier. Of London seafarers 
appearing in the admiralty court in 1640 – 2, 60 per cent were under thirty-ﬁve, of whom 
approximately one-third were under twenty-ﬁve, and another third aged between twenty-ﬁve 
and thirty.43 Seafaring careers could begin before the age of twenty, so it is possible that some 
of these men had formative experiences of neglect in the Caroline navy; but it seems quite 
unlikely that all or even many of them did. 44 Also, a large proportion of the maritime 
community appear to have been only temporary, moving between seafaring and other trades, 
so that even older seafarers from the sixteen-forties may not have been at sea during the 
sixteen-twenties.45 
 Considering both the youth and occupational mobility of many seafarers, and the 
irregular nature of naval service, it seems probable that only some – perhaps even very few – 
of those present in the ﬂeet in 1642 would have memories of the neglect of the sixteen-
twenties and early sixteen-thirties, and this explanation for the support for parliament begins 
to look a little thin. Those who did have such memories would be older and more experienced 
and may therefore have had some inﬂuence on the opinions of younger men in the ﬂeet. The 
fact that some ofﬁcers such as boatswains and masters who served parliament during the 
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1640 s had had long careers in the navy, some for a number of decades, supports this.46 Yet 
even if some sailors did serve continuously in the royal ﬂeet for three decades, this does not 
necessarily mean that they harboured a burning resentment against both the navy and the 
king. Indeed, at a time when alternative maritime employment was readily available, and 
usually much more generously paid, long naval service would suggest the opposite.47 . 
Moreover, while complaints of neglect and discontent continue into the early sixteen-thirties, 
including those concerning pay owed from the sixteen-twenties, they become progressively 
less numerous and strident.48 Partially this was a result of peace: the administration was not 
subjected to the same debilitating strain as it had been during the war years of the previous 
decade. 
 It was also the outcome of Charles’s sustained campaign to expand and improve the 
navy, extending central control and combating corruption, and raising the controversial ‘ship 
money’ levy to fund large, regular ﬂeets, which provided much-needed experience.49 Charles 
also raised the pay of sailors for the ﬁrst time since Elizabeth, which in his opinion should 
have ensured their loyalty – it seems that he, too, misjudged the motivations of seafarers.50 
More recently historians have been less condemnatory in their judgements of Charles’s naval 
activity during the sixteen-thirties.51 While it is perhaps dangerous to argue from silence, the 
lack of organized complaint during the later sixteen-thirties, considering that sailors were 
prepared to protest so volubly during the sixteen-twenties, suggests that conditions had 
improved, or that too few sailors were now affected by them to result in widespread protest. 
Therefore, though memories of past mistreatment might have motivated some sailors during 
the sixteen-forties, this alone cannot explain why the sailors of the ﬂeet chose to support 
parliament. 
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Another interpretation has been advanced by Nabil Matar who, as an expert on Ottoman and 
north African history, brings a valuable international perspective, and whose suggestions are 
more persuasive because they are relevant to the whole maritime community, though they are 
essentially another variation on the ‘neglect’ theme which again assumes that seafarers were 
primarily occupied by maritime issues.52 His argument does not in fact relate explicitly to the 
July episode when the ﬂeet sided with parliament, but rather to the causes of the civil war as a 
whole. Matar points to the rise in the activity of north African corsairs, both within the 
Mediterranean and in the Atlantic, which created a ‘crisis of captivity’ for European sailors.53 
Large numbers of European seafarers were captured and spent some time imprisoned or 
enslaved in Tunis, Algiers or other Maghreb ports: David Hebb estimates that some 7,000 
English captives were taken in 1622-42.54 
 Under Elizabeth, Matar argues, a number of policies had been pursued to counter this 
threat, including state-supported ransoms for captured seafarers. By contrast, the early Stuart 
governments failed to provide similar schemes, allowing sailors to remain imprisoned despite 
repeated petitions from their wives and families.55 It was during Charles’s reign, too, that 
Magharibi corsairs attacked Britain itself in raids which carried away captives from Lundy 
and Baltimore.56 Matar may be right to suggest that these developments created a sense of 
danger, and disappointment with the royal government, in the merchant and maritime 
communities, though his claims for their role in causing the civil wars are perhaps 
overstated.57 
 However, the situation was not such a clear case of decline from Elizabethan to Stuart 
times, which is a common narrative in maritime history.58 Though he was, perhaps, not as 
committed as Elizabeth to protecting British seafarers, or at least less successful at it, Charles 
did pursue some policies to guard the maritime community. In 1626 he concluded a peace 
with Salé which saw the release of all English prisoners, though hostilities were later 
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renewed.59 An expedition led by William Rainsborough blockaded Salé in 1637 and, though 
this did not destroy that corsair base, it did result in the release of 293 English captives.60 
Rainsborough certainly thought it successful enough to suggest a similar action against 
Algiers the following year, though this never took place, probably due to the developing 
British crisis.61 Matar’s argument is also focused very narrowly upon the activities of those 
based in the Maghreb, but the actions of European forces, most importantly those based at 
Dunkirk, would also have contributed to any sense of vulnerability among the seafaring 
community, even if Europeans were less interested in capturing sailors for ransom.62 
Certainly, in 1640-2, there were complaints about Dunkirk and Calais as well as Algiers or 
Tunis.63 
 In addition, Matar’s argument may have unexplored implications for our 
understanding of the ‘ship money’ ﬂeets. The government justiﬁed collection of ‘ship money’ 
by the emergency situation, claiming it was intended explicitly to counteract piracy and to 
protect British trade. This has often been seen by historians as a duplicitous pretext for a navy 
which was, in effect, a diplomatic tool aimed against the Dutch and French (Kenneth 
Andrews also dismisses Rainsborough’s expedition as a ‘side-show’).64 It seems, however, 
that this is over-emphasizing a distinction not necessarily understood at the time, and giving 
too much attention to the complaints of particular ofﬁcers, among them Pennington.65 
Certainly, as vice-admiral, Pennington was well placed to comment on the affairs of the 
ﬂeets, but other ofﬁcers passed more positive judgements, Sir William Monson claiming that 
they ‘produced both renown and safety to [Charles] and [his] realm’.66 Even Pennington 
acknowledged in 1636 that he had sailed along the western coast neither meeting nor hearing 
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any news of pirates or foreign warships, ‘which is more than ever he could say before when 
in those waters’.67 
 While Charles certainly had a predilection for building large ships which were 
unsuited to chasing manoeuvrable corsairs, and his captains sometimes complained that to 
counter piracy successfully they needed smaller and faster vessels, they also occasionally 
reported effectively dealing with pirates, and the mere presence of large royal ﬂeets may have 
made a difference.68 There is plenty of persuasive evidence presented by Matar that piracy 
continued to pose a problem throughout the sixteen-thirties, but at times complaints of piracy 
grew less clamorous, suggesting that the navy achieved some moderate successes until 
rebellion in Scotland in 1638 crippled the government’s ﬁnancial capabilities.69 If we accept 
Matar’s claim of the genuine threat posed by corsairs, then perhaps seafarers, and more 
generally coastal communities, would actually have welcomed an increased naval presence, 
though perhaps not the taxes to fund it.  
Finally, Matar draws too large a comparison between royal neglect and 
parliamentarian policies, though these may have initially promised success. In December 
1641 parliament began to raise money for the relief of captives, but the issue continued to be 
debated throughout the sixteen-forties, and complaints which persisted until 1644, especially 
from ‘the poor Women that daily attend the House, whose Husbands are Captives in Algiers’, 
suggest that these methods were not effective.70 When parliament ﬁnally, in October 1645, 
sent a ship laden with coin intended to ransom English sailors, the voyage was a spectacular 
disaster. The ship exploded at Gibraltar, and after whatever gold the crew could prevent from 
being stolen was laden onto another English ship, this too sank in a storm on the way back to 
England.71 Clearly, this was not parliament’s fault: but the fact that this took so long to 
organize suggests that it was not among parliament’s top priorities. A second expedition in 
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1646 was somewhat more successful, freeing 245 captives, fewer than Rainsborough’s 1637 
expedition.72 
 The increase in both Magharibi and European piracy naturally caused concern within 
the maritime community as a threat both to individuals and to their livelihood, and the failure 
of the navy to prevent it may therefore have created a sense of anti-government 
disillusionment among the maritime community, but it is far from clear whether it prompted a 
unanimously hostile response to Charles’s naval programme. Nor did parliament deliver 
redress as swiftly or efﬁciently as Matar claimed, although the initial moves made in 1640-2 
probably appeared positive. As with the question of naval neglect, it seems difﬁcult to explain 
the decisions of seafarers in 1640-2 solely in these terms. 
 
A third interpretation has been suggested by Richard Harding, though this idea has not been 
fully explored. In a general history of the navy, Harding argued that the ‘common seamen 
largely shared the loyalties of the seamen ofﬁcers’, and that these ‘bonds of leadership [were] 
based upon a common heritage in the maritime community of merchants, shopkeepers, 
artisans, shipowners, masters and sailors’. More importantly, he contended that: 
 
There had been no sudden revolution in the ﬂeet. Professional tension had been 
rising during the late 1630 s and the close relationship between the seamen 
ofﬁcers, Trinity House [the corporation of shipmasters], the Thames maritime 
community, the City merchants and Parliament gave that resentment a political 
focus. 
 
Here again, the emphasis is upon seafarers’ preoccupation with their own profession, and 
Harding echoed Oppenheim that this ‘professional tension’ may have been the result of 
‘years of resentment against the Crown’s navy, resulting from delayed pay, [and] poor 
victuals and clothes’.73 Even if the theory of naval ‘resentment’ is not convincing, the idea 
that the support for parliament among the maritime community was a reaction to the intrusive 
policies of Charles I and the result of a ‘common heritage’ is an appealing one, and ﬁts with 
the arguments of historians who see Charles’s approach to government disturbing the delicate 
balance of Stuart Britain.74 It also implies that the vocational identity of seafarers was critical 
in determining their reactions to the central government. 
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 Charles was certainly more deliberate in attempting to exert his ‘sovereignty’ over the 
seas surrounding Britain than many of his predecessors.75 This was partially a question of 
circumstances; in the early seventeenth century, following Grotius’s Mare Liberum, the 
question of authority at sea exercised European governors and legal theorists alike.76  At the 
same time, the rise of Dutch maritime power, and speciﬁcally in the sixteen-thirties the 
expansion of the French navy and increasing tensions between France and Britain, made this 
a practical issue.77 Charles’s anxiety is evident in his orders to captains that they should 
‘maintain the King’s honour, and the regality of the Narrow Seas, if it should be 
questioned’.78 They were ‘to be the more jealous because some pretend to have an interest in 
the sovereignty of these seas’, although when Pennington requested clariﬁcation as to who 
these pretenders were he received only a vague answer.79  
 At the same time Charles sponsored a more developed theoretical justiﬁcation of his 
‘sovereignty’, culminating in John Selden’s famous Mare Clausum, dedicated to Charles and 
written under ‘the auspices of your roused Majesty’.80 An English translation of Selden’s text 
did not appear until the sixteen-ﬁfties, but nevertheless these arguments were implemented in 
Charles’s naval policy.81 In 1634 a ‘Reglement for the Narrow Seas’ was published, declaring 
that ‘the seas, commonly called the four English Seas, are more infested nowadays than 
heretofore by Men of War . . . to the denial and impeachment of that Sovereignty . . . which 
his Majesty and Predecessors time out of mind have had’, and banning all violence in these 
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seas.82 This proclamation also stated that Charles intended that maps delineating these 
‘English seas’ would be ‘afﬁxed in the most Publick places of his Chiefest Sea-Towns and 
Harbours’, although it seems that this was never carried out.83  
Charles’s policies had a number of practical implications for the maritime community 
which may have been intrusive: Charles effectively wanted to expand the pace domini regis 
beyond the shores of his kingdom to envelop the maritime sphere.84 His prohibition of 
seaborne violence, except that conducted by royal ships, contradicted the custom of reprisal 
and privateering by which merchants and ship-owners pursued reparations for damage done 
by pirates or enemies.85 There also appears to have been a change in attitude towards 
seafarers and their vocational culture. Orders issued to naval captains during the sixteen-
twenties included the proviso ‘in all things not p[ar]ticularly here directed y[o]u are to follow 
the knowne orders of the Sea’, a phrase which had disappeared by 1629 . Similarly, 
references to religious services ‘according to the use of the Church of England and of the sea’ 
were replaced by just the liturgy of the Church of England.86 It seems that Charles was 
attempting to integrate seafarers and the semi-autonomous space of the ship more ﬁrmly into 
his vision of the British state, though these orders applied only to naval vessels.87 
In other, more concrete ways, the royal government interfered in maritime affairs. The 
king pursued a legal course to deny coastal towns traditional rights and perquisites of 
admiralty, in order to assert his own jurisdiction.88 Charles also ordered that all British ships 
should bring their goods into British ports, because when they unloaded at foreign ports he 
was deprived of customs revenues; the master and merchant of one ship stopped by Captain 
Plumleigh were reported to ‘storme much at the stay and refuse utterly to pay any Custome or 
composition as a thing unheard of till this time’.89 It is revealing that this was criticized as an 
innovation, and opposition to it, and to other forms of maritime authority, continued in 
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following years.90 These incidents of isolated protest do not necessarily add up to a rise in 
‘professional tension’, a ‘resentment’ given ‘political focus’ during the sixteen-thirties: there 
were no major riots in that decade as there had been in the sixteen-twenties and would be 
again in the sixteen-forties. Yet they do hint that seafarers were brought more forcefully into 
contact with the state during Charles’s personal rule, usually through the navy, and in ways 
not exactly calculated to engender a positive response. It could have been precisely this 
increased contact which drew seafarers into national debates. As with the question of naval 
neglect, or the impact of piracy, there is insufﬁcient evidence to regard this as the decisive 
factor in July 1642, but it may, like them, have contributed towards the outbreak of civil war. 
 
Some seafarers perhaps disliked the Stuart regime because of mistreatment during naval 
service, and preferred parliament because they promised better conditions and pay; some 
probably felt that Charles had not protected British trade from piracy as much as he should 
have done. Others could have resented the government’s increased interference in maritime 
affairs, which in some ways challenged the vocational culture and independence of 
seafarers.Yet none of these theories, based on a negative attitude towards Charles and his 
government, and solely dealing with the maritime sphere, adequately explains the apparently 
enthusiastic support for parliament within the ﬂeet. We must integrate these arguments with a 
more careful survey of the available evidence, paying particular attention to the wider 
maritime community rather than just the navy. It is instructive, in this case, to compare the 
involvement of seafarers in popular protests and petitioning during the sixteen-twenties and 
sixteen-forties, as these provide the clearest evidence concerning the attitudes of the maritime 
community.91 
 The later sixteen-twenties were a time of political turmoil in London. Parliament and 
the king were repeatedly at loggerheads, there were frequently large crowds in Westminster, 
and in the east of the city sailors gathered to protest and riot in complaint over their treatment 
and pay.92 Yet there are a few important characteristics of these riots which must be borne in 
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mind. Signiﬁcantly, they seem to have been isolated from similar protests elsewhere, and 
comprised mostly disgruntled seamen, and perhaps their families, as well as some soldiers; 
much protest took place aboard ship.93 Moreover, the targets of larger, London-based protests 
were clearly the naval administrators. In October 1626, an order was given to restrain the 
‘disorderly repair of mariners and soldiers to London’ to demand pay, and when they 
confronted the duke of Buckingham, then admiral, he initially made promises, but afterwards 
forbade them to come to court.94 In late 1627 and early 1628, the navy commissioners 
complained that mariners ‘doe much trouble, and interrupt us at o[u]r meetings’, and that 
unless they were paid ‘nothing can bee expected but a sudden mutinie’; the government 
consequently threatened the sailors with the city’s militia.95 
 In addition, the demands of the sailors clearly concern only immediate material 
grievances: within the navy, the complaints are almost entirely about the lack of pay or 
supplies, which are supported by similar criticisms from naval ofﬁcers.96 Mariners also 
complained about the general situation of trade. In March 1627, a petition ‘of all the mariners 
and poore Seafaring men, within the Ports and Sea coast Townes, betweene London and 
Barwick’ complained of the ‘many misseries w[hi]ch the pet[itione]rs groane under’, and 
requested the king to ‘curb the over-daring Enemie’.97 Similar complaints, again focused on 
wages and the conditions of trade, were articulated in a petition to parliament in 1628.98 We 
should, though, be careful about complaints concerning the state of trade: these were 
perennial and perhaps represent a similar sensitivity to subsistence levels to that found in 
agrarian communities.99 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
chs. 4 – 7; T. Cogswell, ‘Foreign policy and parliament: the case of La Rochelle, 1625 – 6 ’, Eng. Hist. Rev., 
xcix 
(1984), 241 – 67; T. Cogswell, ‘Prelude to Ré: the Anglo-French struggle over La Rochelle, 1624 – 7’, History, 
lxxi (1986), 1 – 21; R. Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics, 1626 – 8 (Oxford, 1987); T. Cogswell, ‘A 
low road to extinction? Supply and redress of grievances in the parliaments of the 1620s’, Historical Jour., 
xxxiii (1990), 283 – 303; R. Cust, Charles I: a Political Life (Harlow, 2007), ch. 5. For events in London in 
particular, see V. Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National 
Politics, 1625 – 43 (1961), pp. 76 – 9. 
93 Cal. S.P. Dom. 1625 – 6, pp. 304, 324, 359, 366, 379, 423, 449, 460; Cal. S.P. Dom. 1627 – 8, pp. 173, 513; 
Cal. S.P. Dom. 1629 – 31, p. 64. 
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 It is therefore appropriate to see this spectrum of protest and complaint, ranging from 
collective mutinies aboard individual ships to large-scale crowd actions in London, as 
emerging from the same grievances, and inﬂuenced by a tradition of labour protest by which 
sailors sometimes negotiated the conditions of their employment. It is in the same period, 
according to Kenneth Andrews, that mutiny was increasing among seafarers, due to the 
expansion in trade and consequently the demand for seafaring labour.100 Certainly, there was 
anxiety in the government over the tactics sailors used to protest; writing signatures in a 
circle, and the ‘common answer of One and All’, by which seafarers avoided any individual 
being singled out as ringleader, were prohibited by the admiralty court in 1631.101 It therefore 
seems reasonable to locate the protests of the sixteen-twenties within this tradition of mutiny, 
as they were conﬁned to the maritime community, and provoked by issues arising from naval 
employment and the decline of trade during wartime. 
 It is difﬁcult to see the protests of the early sixteen-forties in the same way, though the 
actions of individual seafarers may still have been shaped by these conventions of labour 
protest. In some popular political actions, admittedly, the distinct concerns of the community 
are apparent. Early in May 1641, some thousand sailors rioted near the Tower, protesting 
against the closing of ports; they pulled down some houses before the militia drove them off, 
killing three.102 The crowd reportedly ‘got the Flag of a ship’ before they marched on the 
Tower, implying an element of deliberate political theatre and perhaps the sense that this was 
a speciﬁc seafaring matter, though their choice of target, the principal fortress of the country 
rather than the ofﬁces of the naval administration, is signiﬁcant.103 There is only one mention 
of ‘insolencies and misdemeano[u]rs’ among sailors aboard a naval ship, in July 1641, which 
appears to be over lack of money.104 Disorder was more widespread, though: in May 1642 
Trinity House passed an ‘Act touching disordered Seamen’, describing ‘daily complaints of 
the disorders of Seamen and of theire want of care, and honestie, in not attendinge and lyeing 
aboard theire shipps aswell here in the River before they goe forth as alsoe after they come 
home’, and authorizing masters to ﬁne mariners who were tardy after being hired.105 
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 However, during the sixteen-forties sailors joined riots which involved a wide range 
of society, especially apprentices and other young people. The targets of these protests were 
not the naval administration, but political and religious sites: one of the largest riots, in May 
1640 , focused on Lambeth Palace, seat of the archbishop of Canterbury.106 Following this 
riot, the privy council wrote to both Watermen’s Hall and Trinity House. The council 
complained that ‘there were diu[e]rs idle & lewd p[er]sons transported to & from Ratcliff, 
Blackwall, [Rotherhithe], wapping & other p[ar]ts thereab[ou]ts, whereby [th]e s[ai]d 
disorderly & rebellious assemblies were much increased’, and ordered that no ‘idle or 
suspected p[er]sons’ should be given passage on boats at night.107 The mention of these 
speciﬁc hamlets, where seafarers were numerous, and the inclusion of Trinity House in this 
order, suggests a large number of mariners were involved in the riot. According to one 
observer, in the winter of 1641 seamen and watermen again ‘came by water before 
Whitehall’ in barges, at the same time as large crowds of apprentices gathered outside 
Westminster.108 
 Clearly, the maritime community were not interested only in the conditions of the 
shipping industry: rather, issues speciﬁc to seafaring were popularly and publicly linked to 
the wider crisis in Britain. In none of the public statements purporting to come from seafarers 
during these years is there any mention of naval mistreatment and neglect, and in most, 
anxiety about maritime employment was associated with the political debates of the day, in 
particular the clash of religious identities which had begun to tear Britain apart. A petition 
submitted to the House of Lords by ‘young Men, Apprentices and Seamen’ on 26 January 
1642, and subsequently printed, complained of suffering ‘unsupportable pressures’ because 
‘Trading is extraordinarily decayed’, which suggests a preoccupation with material concerns. 
However, the petition blamed this on ‘that abominable Rebellion of the bloody Papists’ in 
Ireland, which had begun the previous October, and requested that ‘the Kingdome at home 
may be speedily put into such a posture of Warre and defence, as may enable them against all 
forreigne Invasion, and domestique plots, and conspiracies of Papists, and their adherents’.109 
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 On 14 January, the House of Commons had appointed a committee to consider 
‘putting the Kingdom into a Posture of Defence’, suggesting that the drafters of the petition 
were well informed about attitudes in parliament.110 As it was Warwick who introduced this 
petition to the Lords, it could suggest that some leading ﬁgures in the maritime community 
were already working closely with him.111 A very similar petition from ‘the marriners and 
sea-men, inhabitants in, and about the ports of London’, supposedly ‘subscribed by many 
thousands’, had been submitted to the House of Commons earlier in the month.112 Likewise, 
an anonymous Generall remonstrance or declaration of the sea-men, dated 31 January, 
described its subjects as ‘wee of the true Protestant Religion’, and, while addressing Charles 
in respectful terms, primarily requested letters of marque against the Irish.113 These petitions, 
and possibly also the Remonstrance, suggest that a number of mariners were aware of, 
concerned about, and involved in political developments on a national scale. 
 It is no coincidence that these documents originated in January 1642, a particularly 
fraught month during which Charles, having failed in his attempt to arrest ﬁve members of 
the Commons and one peer, ﬂed London.114 The petition to the Commons was in fact 
submitted to a committee of the House sitting at the Guildhall in the midst of this crisis.115 
Some 2,000 sailors took part in the procession which triumphantly returned these ﬁve to 
Westminster later in the month, and the longest discussion of seafarers’ political activity is 
found in The seamans protestation concerning their ebbing and ﬂowing to . . . Westminster, a 
justiﬁcation of these actions.116 Some historians, usually because of an assumption that sailors 
were largely illiterate, have been reluctant to see this text as genuinely representative of the 
maritime community. Powell claimed that it had been written by ‘a far abler hand than that of 
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an ordinary seaman’, and more recently Brian Lavery declared that it ‘was far too literate and 
politically sophisticated to be the work of the average seaman’.117 
 The fact that it was published on Warwick’s order may indeed suggest that it was a 
piece of parliamentarian propaganda. However, it could still have been produced by a 
seafarer, perhaps one of the Trinity House clique of shipmasters who were to take naval 
commands during the war, some of whom, for example William Batten, had previously 
published complex navigational texts.118 These were presumably not what Powell and Lavery 
had in mind for ‘ordinary’ or ‘average’ sailors, but they were nevertheless inﬂuential 
members of the maritime community, and literacy among seafarers appears to have been 
higher than previously thought.119 The pamphlet, then, should not be dismissed so lightly. 
 The seamans protestation suggests a great deal of sensitivity to both the impact of 
seafarers’ involvement in political demonstrations, and the interpretations likely to be placed 
upon this. It attempts to defend seafarers from potential accusations of meddling in affairs 
beyond their station, or even of rebellion. The pamphlet opens by acknowledging that ‘Ovr 
appearance above the Bridge, being a passage the Histories of England cannot exempliﬁe, 
may cause our good intents and well-meaning, in the various apprehensions of most men to 
be misconstrued’. The author maintained that the sailors were not called by parliament, but 
came ‘of our own free voluntarie disposition . . . as well to protect White-hall, had his 
Majestie been there, as the Parliament house’.120 The main concerns of the pamphlet were 
characterized in religious terms; enemies were deﬁned as ‘Papists’, and seafaring described 
as a defence of Protestantism, the author adding that ‘although we have no Churches, we say 
our prayers as well as you, the same God you have at shore is ours at sea’.121 The 
Protestation concluded with an oath supposedly sworn by mariners, to defend religion ‘as it 
was established in the dayes of Queen Elisabeth’, to protect the king and parliament, and 
‘from my heart to abhor all Poperie’.122 This was, as John Walter noted, closely modelled on 
another ‘Protestation oath’ sworn throughout London on the orders of parliament.123 In the 
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eastern suburbs of Limehouse, Ratcliff, Poplar and Blackwall, 1,688 men swore this oath, and 
only sixty-six refused, although a further 510 in Limehouse and Ratcliff were listed as ‘at 
sea’.124 This evidence indicates, like the petitions and Generall remonstrance of the same 
month, that the activities of seafarers were not focused upon some internal dispute about the 
navy, nor a reaction solely to concerns over trade, but were part of the wider crisis gripping 
Britain. 
 
In 1640-2, then, large numbers of seafarers participated in popular political agitation which 
appears to be markedly different in composition, targets and purpose to the naval riots of the 
sixteen-twenties. It might be argued that it was only different in appearance, that the 
underlying resistance was essentially similar, but that seafarers protested in the language of 
the moment – allegations of corruption and inefﬁciency in the sixteen-twenties, religious and 
political crisis in the sixteen-forties. Even this would suppose a political awareness rarely 
accorded to the maritime community by historians. Yet the further evidence for political and 
religious disputes within the community at a personal level belies this, emphasizing the extent 
to which these issues mattered to individuals. 
 Much of this evidence comes from the parish of Stepney, where there was the greatest 
concentration of mariners in London, and which may have been unique; no other Thames-
side parish has generated so much evidence of open debate and argument. Certainly religious 
feelings ran high in the parish in the early sixteen-forties. It would seem that William Stampe, 
previously Stepney’s schoolmaster and appointed vicar in 1641 , was unpopular with some of 
his parishioners, particularly because of his sympathy for the king and the Book of Common 
Prayer.125 Indeed, the dislike for Stampe and the ofﬁcial liturgy, and the discontent with royal 
government, were very closely linked in the parish. At Easter 1642, John Baskett allegedly 
said 
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that hee did not care for the kinge & that hee was as good a man as the kinge w[i]th many 
other wild speeches both ag[ain]st Mr Stamp Vicar & . . . ag[ain]st the booke of Com[m]on 
prayer sayinge [tha]t all [tha]t heard & read it were damned.126 
 
Rachel Weaburne, also from Stepney, was presented to the Middlesex bench in July ‘for 
sayinge that Mr Edgworth Curate of Stepney p[ar]ish was a damnd dogg & [tha]t shee would 
rather goe to heare a Cart wheele creake and a dogg barke than to heare him preach and other 
ill language’, while Rachell Pollister was accused in the same month of ‘sayinge that the 
kinge was a papist and a ranke papist & Cronicled for one’.127 These disputes also involved at 
least some members of the seafaring community. On 3 March 1642, William Berry, a mariner 
of Wapping, was accused by Edward Allen, another seaman from Suffolk, of ‘villifying of 
the King in saying that he cared not a fart for the Kinge’.128 Clearly vocational ties could 
clash with other social loyalties. 
 In the summer of 1642, as events leading to war accelerated, Stampe got into trouble 
with parliament.129 On 25 July, he was accused of violently interrupting the recruitment of 
volunteers for parliament’s army.130 Not long after this Stampe and his brother were accused 
of inciting a group of sailors to disturb a sermon at the church.131 This might simply be 
playing on the stereotype of unruly mariners, but it could also suggest that there were 
seafarers committed to the traditional church establishment and opposed to parliament’s 
religious reforms, as well as those who supported them. Stepney had some inhabitants who 
were as outspoken against parliament as others were against the king: Sara Linge, a widow, 
was accused on 2 August of ‘speakinge dangerous words . . . saying, If some of her neighbors 
would joyne with her, she would cutt the throats of a thousand Roundheads & Brownists’, 
insults applied to parliament’s supporters.132 
 This division in the parish seems to have existed at the very least from the start of 
1642, at about the same time when the seamen’s petitions, Remonstrance and Protestation 
were published. An undated printed petition to the House of Commons from Stepney and the 
surrounding parishes discussed the tensions that were already bubbling. It does not appear in 
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the Commons Journal, but given its reference to ‘Mr. Pym, and the other foure’ (that is, the 
ﬁve members of the Commons whom Charles attempted to arrest) this most likely also dates 
from January.133 Indeed, this petition was printed by William Larner of Eastcheap, who also 
printed a variant of the 26 January petition to the Lords discussed earlier, as well as other 
petitions and religious texts at about the same time, which may indicate that these were the 
work of the same, or connected, people.134 
 The Stepney petition opened by stating that the Thames parishes were left vulnerable 
because ‘a great part of the Inhabitants . . . are Mariners, and other Persons belonging to 
Navigation, who are often at Sea’. Its main thrust was an accusation against the garrison of 
the Tower, ‘lately put into the same’, of being ‘many of them Alehouse keepers, and most of 
them, of loose Conversations’, while ‘the Trained Souldiers of the Hamlets, who watch in the 
Tower, are conﬁned unto strait places’. The petitioners then claimed that 
 
Divers words . . . have been spoken, by sundry Persons . . . tending to the 
disuniting of the two Kingdomes of England and Scotland, to the defamation of 
divers Members of this honourable House, and intimating some bloody designe in 
hand, against the well affected of the Kingdome, under the names of Puritans and 
Brownists. 
 
The principal culprit was Richard Cray, a constable of Stepney and new warder of the Tower, 
who had ‘endeavoured to raise men in Armes, to keepe those whom he calls Puritans and 
Brownists, from coming to Church, and hath with many others, his partakers, greatly 
opposed, the two worthy Preachers at Stepney, Mr. Burroughes, and Mr. Greenhill’, who had 
been newly appointed by parliament.135 Cray was indeed an ‘Alehouse keeper’, who was 
bound for good behaviour on 21 January, ‘beeing by the house of Commons judged not ﬁtt to 
keepe a victualling house’, and for ‘some scandalous speeches . . . against the said howse’.136 
The petitioners clearly felt threatened by Cray and his comrades in the Tower, seeing it as a 
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particular local manifestation of the national problem, and requested permission to ‘put 
themselves into a Posture of defence’, again employing parliament’s own language. 
Some of the other ‘sundry Persons’ were named, and their ‘words’ recorded, in a 
schedule attached to the petition. John Walter of Limehouse was accused of ‘many rayling 
speeches, calling divers people of honest report, a company of damned Puritan-whores and 
rogues . . . [saying] he hoped ere long, to see all their throates cut, or they hang’d, as those are 
in Ireland’. A writ appears in the Middlesex assize records against Walter for the same 
words.137 The existence of a petition speciﬁcally naming individual parishioners and hinting 
at threats of violence, and the bandying about of insulting religious labels, in addition to the 
other evidence for religious disputes in Stepney, suggest a very public contest over the future 
of the parish which was deﬁned in terms of the major religious and other national issues then 
being debated across the country. Nor was this wholly limited to Stepney: in St. Olave’s, 
Southwark, another parish with a high proportion of mariners, some of the parishioners 
disturbed the vicar’s administration of the sacrament during 1641.138 It is unlikely that the 
seafarers, maritime tradesmen and their families resident in these parishes would have been 
wholly ignorant of these disputes. Some were deﬁnitely involved, and others were active in 
different ways that suggest religious conviction. For example, the Commons Journal records 
in August 1642 that ‘Mariners upon the River Thames’ were lending money ‘for the Affairs 
of Ireland’.139 
Contentious debate on national issues also appears to have penetrated the royal ﬂeet; 
indeed, to have done so quite some time before it broke out in Stepney. Thomas Cooke, a 
boatswain from Chatham, was accused of saying on 25 April 1641: 
 
that King Charles was a Tyrant in demanding ship-monies, & that in England 
kings had beene deposed and murdered for lesse matters alleadging further, for 
iustiﬁng of his speeches, [th]e deposing of King Richard the second of England, & 
Jehu’s killing of Jehoram, & [th]e Netherlanders falling off from the king of 
Spaine. 
 
The corporal of the Guardland, William Toomes, was likewise accused of saying, on 20 
August in the captain’s cabin, that ‘[th]e Spanish & French kings were forbidden by [th]e 
Pope to aide [th]e Scotts, because now there were great hopes [tha]t king Charles would 
proue a Romane Catholicke’. Both had apparently said, on board a different ship on 15 June, 
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that the king ought to settle peace with the Scots, because a number of counties ‘would 
w[i]thstand pressing of souldiers’.Their accusers, three surgeons and a clerk from Rochester, 
stated that: 
 
The continual disc[ou]rse of theise two men . . . is, touching his M[ajes]tie & 
State-affaires, euen publickly, before common seamen, still censuring what is 
done by his M[ajes]tie & [th]e State; & speaking most athistically against 
Bishops, & all church-men, & church-discipline, & Ecclesiasticall Courts . . . [if 
one of them] heares of any thing disastrous to [th]e king or state . . . he relates it 
againe in a gesture of reioycing.140 
 
The surgeons also complained that they ‘haue been thre[ate]ned to be throwne ouer-board, 
least they call theise . . . in question & haue beene disc[ou]rteously used by [th]e Capt[ain], 
for this very cause, & . . . Cooke would still boldly say, [tha]t [th]e Capt[ain] would beare 
him out in all things’.141 Indeed, both Captain Fogge and the gunner of the Guardland were 
accused of attempting to keep the witnesses quiet ‘by promises & threatninges’, stating that 
‘they had spoken noething but what became honest men to speak’.142 Also intriguing is the 
mention of ‘those pamphletts scattered abroad against the king by [th]e Scots, & printed 
beyond sea’, the contents of which Toomes endorsed as true, ‘adding thereuntoe [tha]t [th]e 
Scotts rebelled, because the king intended to bring in Arminianisme & Popery amongst 
them’.143 
 Toomes, Cooke and the gunner all claimed that they ‘never thought or said such 
thinge or thinges’, though that is not a surprising response to a charge of treason.144 These 
scant and contested accusations thus cannot be taken to indicate wholesale disaffection 
among the ﬂeet and the maritime community, and there are no similar reports for later in the 
sixteen-forties, for example the reaction in the ﬂeet to the Irish rebellion which seems to have 
ﬂared passions so dramatically in Stepney. Nevertheless, the very existence of such 
accusations, and their detail, is compelling evidence for sensitivity to the religious and 
political issues then causing divisions across Britain, and hint at the existence of animated, 
informed and sustained debate among sailors, from ‘common seamen’ to ships’ captains. In 
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the light of this evidence, it is impossible to treat all seafarers as politically ignorant and 
motivated only by economic conditions. 
 In particular, religion appears as the major motivating factor in mobilizing a 
signiﬁcant proportion of the maritime community both to support and to oppose parliament, 
with a particular crisis occurring in January 1642, a response to Charles’s attempted arrest of 
ﬁve members of the Commons and one lord, and internal disputes within the Thames 
parishes, resulting from panic over the Irish rebellion. Though John Adamson has recently 
criticized the idea of the civil wars as England’s ‘wars of religion’, a phrase ﬁrst employed by 
John Morrill, and though the concern over other political issues such as illegal taxation is also 
apparent, religion is the consistent thread which links together the dispute in Stepney, the 
rioting throughout 1640-2 and seemingly the disquiet in the ﬂeet.145 That is not to suggest that 
there was a coherent religious underground, uniting all of those seafarers dissatisﬁed with the 
religious situation in Britain and seeking a different church establishment. Rather, as a 
number of historians have recently concluded, of all the diverse factors which pushed people 
into civil war, it appears that religion – or fear and paranoia associated with religious 
identities – was the most widespread and the most emotive.146 
 
What emerges most powerfully from this evidence is that seafarers, though undeniably (and 
quite expectedly) interested in issues of maritime employment and naval policy, did not focus 
upon these questions to the exclusion of the broader political situation. On the contrary, the 
sources show that seafarers explicitly drew attention to the identity they shared with co-
religionists and reacted to major national events as much as to speciﬁc maritime ones. They 
were hardly ‘outcasts’. However, the stereotype of the ‘seaman’ should not be discounted, for 
seafarers themselves played upon it in their public actions. It is important, too, to 
acknowledge the substantial variety between seafarers; not all of them were religiously and 
politically committed, and of those that were, not all were parliamentarian in their 
sympathies. Yet the parliamentarians among them, some at least associated with Warwick 
and present both in London’s eastern suburbs and the royal ﬂeet, could not have appealed 
successfully in the language they did if these sentiments had been totally absent.The decision 
of the majority of naval sailors to support parliament in July 1642 thus ﬁts into the longer 
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development of attitudes among seafarers, not just into a narrative of ofﬁcers’ actions. As 
Warwick himself was keen to emphasize, though with obvious polemical purpose, it was the 
sailors who did the ‘seizing’.  
 This study supports the argument by Lewis Fischer that to realize the ﬁeld’s full 
potential, maritime historians must give more attention to ‘appropriate contexts’.147 Yet the 
criticism made by Fischer and others that some maritime historians remain ‘locked into local 
or national approaches’ is not entirely fair.148 Seafarers were critical ﬁgures in the 
increasingly globalized networks of exchange during the early modern period, key 
intermediaries of cultural and economic contact. They also lived within local and national 
frameworks, and shared identities with the society from which they originated as well as on 
the level of a vocational seafaring community. The two dimensions were not distinct but 
contributed symbiotically to one another: both form part of the vast and multifaceted story 
that maritime history can tell, and the real challenge is to approach both. 
 In 1995, Frank Broeze argued that ‘Once our own house is in order and doubts about 
our identity and purpose are erased, the task of integrating maritime history into general 
history . . . can be pursued with conviction and conﬁdence’.149 The persistence among 
maritime historians of a ‘siege mentality’ and ‘sense of crisis’, which Broeze noted, suggests 
that he had it the wrong way round.150 Only by integrating maritime history into ‘general 
history’, by engaging with the debates of other historical ﬁelds, can ‘doubts about our identity 
and purpose’ be resolved. Perhaps, in this respect, it is worth returning to David J. Starkey 
and Basil Greenhill’s argument, made twenty-ﬁve years ago, that maritime history is not a 
discipline with its own methodology, but a dimension of history as a whole.151 Seafarers 
stand at the crux of many historical developments: to understand them we therefore need to 
place them in relation both to their global impact and to their relationships with society 
ashore. We need to see them not only aboard ship but everywhere else. We need to think 
outside the gundeck. 
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